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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DENNIS R. GILBERT, 
Petitioner, 
-and - CASE NO. C-5166 
BUFFALO MUNICIPAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
THOMAS P. MULLEN, for Petitioner 
GILLIAN BROWN, ESQ., for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (WILLIAM A. HERBERT 
of counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This interlocutory appeal comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to the ruling of 
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denying its motion to dismiss a representation 
petition filed by an individual, Dennis R. Gilbert, permitting the amendment of the 
petition to name a purported employee organization as petitioner and scheduling a 
certification election without conducting an investigation regarding whether the 
employee organization existed at the time of the filing of the petition. The employer, 
Board - C-5166 -2 
Buffalo Municipal Housing Authority (Authority), has not interposed a response, nor has 
Gilbert. 
FACTS 
On November 29, 2001, Gilbert filed a representation petition seeking to 
decertify CSEA astherepresentativeoLcertain public_s.afeiy employees in the employ 
of the Authority. Also, the petition sought certification but listed Gilbert as the petitioner. 
The petition was verified by Gilbert, individually, and the petition omits Gilbert's 
affiliation and/or representative capacity with an employee organization. The showing of 
interest attached to the petition is in the name of the Buffalo Peace Officers Association 
(Association). The declaration of authenticity indicates that the petition is on behalf of 
the Association, but it is signed by Gilbert without identifying his relationship with the 
Association.1 
On January 4, 2002, after CSEA had interposed its answer to the representation 
petition seeking its dismissal because individual employees may not file certification 
petitions, Thomas P. Mullen, Labor Relations Associate for the Association, filed an 
1The declaration of authenticity, dated November 19, 2001, provides as follows: 
Let this letter serve as a Declaration of Authenticity that 
those who have signed the attached petitions did so willingly 
and without coersion [sic] designating the Peace Officers 
Association to act as their sole exclusive collective 
bargaining representative in all matters pertaining to all 
terms and conditions of employment. 
I, Dennis Gilbert, do swear that the signatures on the 
Authorization Petition were signed in my presence on the 
date written on the Petition by the persons whose names 
appear on those petitions. 
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affidavit seeking to amend the petition to include the relevant information omitted from 
the petition, i.e., that the Association is the petitioner and that Gilbert is president of the 
Association. 
At the conference held on January 7, 2002, the ALJ advised CSEA that annexed 
to the representation petition was a showing of interest in suppodof CSEAls 
decertification and the Association's certification. 
On January 16, 2002, CSEA moved to dismiss the representation petition on the 
basis of its filing by an individual and that the Association was not an employee 
organization or, in the alternative, to schedule a hearing on the issue of whether the 
Association existed at the time the petition was filed. By letter dated January 18, 2002, 
the ALJ dismissed the motion on the grounds that the petition and supporting affidavits 
were sufficient to establish the existence of the Association-at the time the petition had 
been filed. The ALJ scheduled a conference on January 31, 2002 for the purpose of 
scheduling the details of an election. 
On February 4, 2002, CSEA commenced the instant interlocutory appeal from 
the ALJ's ruling. 
DISCUSSION 
As we have previously held, permission to appeal rulings made in conjunction 
with the processing of a representation petition will not be granted absent extraordinary 
circumstances.2 We are persuaded to grant review of the issues raised in CSEA's 
2State of New York (NYSCOPBA), 31 PERB 1J3058 (1998); County of Putnam, 
31 PERB H3031 (1998); Town of Saugerties, 30 PERB 1J3002 (1997); Town of Putnam 
Valley and Town of New Paltz, 28 PERB ^3049 (1995). 
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exceptions because of the serious policy implications raised by CSEA's argument that 
noncompliance with the filing requirements may not be subsequently cured by post-
petition conduct. "The exceptions question the very propriety of conducting an election 
because the preconditions to that election allegedly have not been met."3 
Section 20J.2(a) of our Rules of Erocedure (Rules) expressly states that: 
A petition for investigation of a question concerning representation 
of public employees under the act (hereinafter called a petition for 
certification), or a petition alleging that an employee organization 
which has been certified or is being currently recognized should be 
deprived of representation status as to all or part of a unit 
(hereinafter called a petition for decertification), may be filed by one 
or more public employees or any employee organization acting in 
their behalf, or by a public employer, provided that individual 
employees may not file a petition for certification. 
We have strictly enforced our Rules in representation cases because they are 
intended to bring stability and certainty to a process which profoundly affects the 
employment rights and interests of many.4 Strict enforcement of our Rules also avoids 
needless dissipation of our resources and wasting public funds to conduct 
representation proceedings only to later dismiss the petition because the petitioner 
neglected to comply with the Rules.5 
The ALJ allowed the Association to amend the petition by submitting a post-
petition affidavit identifying the Association as the petitioner and Gilbert as the 
3State of New York (NYSCOPBA), supra note 2, at 3121. 
4oee Franklin Square Union Free Sch. Dist, et. ai, 28 PERB p 0 3 6 (1995); 
Enlarged City Sch. Dist. of the City of Amsterdam, 21 PERB 1J3042 (1988); New York 
Convention Ctr. Operating Corp., 20 PERB 1J3063 (1987); County of Rensselaer, 11 
PERB H3046(1978). 
5See Jacob K. Javits Convention Ctr., 19 PERB ^3056(1986). 
Board - C-5166 -5 
Association's president. This was error. Our Rules in representation matters do not 
provide for the amendment of petitions. "As written, the Rules are absolute; they must 
be so applied."6 If we were to allow post-petition submissions to cure defects in the 
petition at the time of filing up to the date of certification, then all of the other conditions 
attached to the invocation of our representation jurisdiction become-meaningless.-The— 
petition for certification, filed by an individual, could not be processed and should have 
been dismissed. 
Our inquiry is not ended here, however. While the petition cannot be processed 
as a petition for certification, the petition and the showing of interest also seek the 
decertification of CSEA. Even if we were to consider that part of the petition separately, 
it would still be dismissed. The declaration of authenticity submitted by Gilbert in 
support of the showing of interest is fatally defective. Section 201.4(d)(1) of the Rules 
requires that the declaration of authenticity include the name of the declarant, and a 
statement of the declarant's authority to execute it and, if on behalf of an employee 
organization, the declarant's authority to execute it on behalf of the organization. 
Finally, §201.4(d)(2) of the Rules requires the declarant to state that inquiry was 
made that the signatories of the showing of interest are included in the existing 
^County of Rensselaer, supra note 4, at 3078. Contrast the absence of language 
permitting amendments in the Ruies regarding representation petitions with Ruies, 
§204.3(e), which provides that an ALJ may permit the respondent to amend the answer 
to an improper practice charge at any time before or during the hearing, or at any time 
prior to the issuance of the ALJ's decision and recommended order. 
7See Franklin Square Union Free Sch. Dist, supra note 4. 
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negotiating unit. Neither Gilbert's declaration nor Mullen's subsequent affidavit complies 
with these Rule requirements. Therefore, the petition must be dismissed in its entirety.8 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are granted and the ALJ's 
ruling denying CSEA's motion to dismiss the Association's petition is reversed. 
ITIS,THEREEORE, ORDERED that the petition be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 26, 2002 
Albany, New York 
- ^ L/lsU't^U~cuS~4 *~-^K 
S~\ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
'Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
See Jamesville-DeWitt Central Sch. Dist, 31 PERB 1J3049 (1998). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Charging Party, 
a n d CASE NQ^U-22204 
BUFFALO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
MICHAEL RISMAN, CORPORATION COUNSEL (MATTHEW VAN VESSEM 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
SCHWAN, SAMMARCO & SAMMARCO (W. JAMES SCHWAN of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Buffalo Police Benevolent 
Association (PBA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which found that 
the PBA had violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when, after August 28, 2000, it failed and refused to negotiate collectively in good faith 
with the City of Buffalo (City) for a timeline to implement one-officer/two-officer patrols. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The PBA alleged twenty-three exceptions to the ALJ decision. In substance, the 
PBA alleged that the ALJ's findings of fact were incorrect which, in turn, led to his 
erroneous conclusion of law. 
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FACTS 
The facts have been set forth in detail in the ALJ's decision.1 We will confine 
ourselves to those facts relevant to this appeal. 
On December 4, 2000, the City filed an improper practice charge alleging that 
the BBA violated-§209-a.2(b) oltheLActby^refusing to.negotiateover proposals and a 
draft agreement relating to the implementation of a timetable to commence the 
utilization of one-officer/two-officer patrols. 
The PBA denied the charge and asserted in its defense that the charge failed to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it was untimely, it raised a violation of 
the parties' collective bargaining agreement, thereby divesting this Board of jurisdiction 
and the City had waived any right to negotiate over the subject matter because the 
issue was settled by a 1992 interest arbitration award. 
Hearings were held on various days in 2001 and the record was closed on 
December 3, 2001. During the hearings, the ALJ received into the record as 
Respondent's Exhibit 1 the 1992 interest arbitration award. In that award, the public 
arbitration panel endorsed the concept of one-officer/two officer patrols and made the 
following award: 
A committee [sic] of equal City of Buffalo/Police Benevolent 
Association membership is to be formed to study and discuss such 
matters as safety, bargaining unit impact, and other items 
regarding a shift to one-person/two-person patrol vehicles. The 
total number of members is to be mutually determined by the City 
and the PBA. 
1
 Buffalo Police Benevolent Ass'n, 35 PERB fi4508 (2002). 
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The Committee shall make effective recommendations to the 
Commissioner of Police. 
The City and the PBA shall negotiate a timetable for the 
implementation of one-person/two-person patrols. 
The ALJ also received into the record, as Joint Exhibit 2, the contract settlement 
-between the _p.arti.es_th.at covered theperiod July 1, 1992 through JuneL30, 1995 
Paragraph 24 of the settlement entitled "One/Two Officer Patrols" contained a reference 
to the 1992 interest arbitration award (also referred to as the Prosper Interest 
Arbitration Award) which provides: "[b]y side letter re-state the parties' Agreement to 
comply with the Prosper Interest Arbitration Award concerning one/two officer patrols 
with the following provision: Each party to this Agreement pledges its best effort 
towards moving to a one/two officer patrol system." 
DISCUSSION 
The PBA contends that the charge failed to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted. To address that issue, we must look to §209-a.2(b) of the Act which makes 
it an "improper practice for an employee organization or its agents deliberately to refuse 
to negotiate collectively in good faith with a public employer, provided it is the duly 
recognized or certified representative of the employees of such employer." 
The Board has held that reasonable expedition is expected in bargaining and 
that "reasonableness is . . . judged by the totality of the circumstances under the facts 
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of each case."2 A party's imposition of conditions for setting a negotiating schedule, 
unavailability and unexplained cancellations of sessions may violate the Act.3 
In reaching his decision, the ALJ went through a litany of correspondence found 
in charging party's Exhibits 1 and 2 that reflected the PBA's general unavailability to 
meet-withJhe City_representatives and negotiate. Jhis-dilatory_conductstarted_inJune 
1992 when the PBA failed to respond to the City's request to establish the Committee 
referred to in the 1992 interest arbitration award. 
The ALJ found that the City had been less than expeditious in meeting its 
obligation to negotiate and "[djuring the decade that the issue of one-officer patrols has 
been joined, both parties at times appeared to be more interested in protracting the 
discussion rather than resolving the issue and reaching a mutual accommodation."4 
This, however, provides no excuse for the PBA to refuse to bargain once the City 
expressed its earnest desire to conclude negotiations over this issue in correspondence 
through August 2000.5 
In 1992, the then and current PBA President, Robert P. Meegan, Jr., sat as the 
employee member of the interest arbitration panel and expressed his support for the 
concept of one-officer patrols. This concept was proposed in 1992 as a method to 
2City of Dunkirk, 25 PERB P029, at 3061 (1992); Jerome Lefkowitz, et al., 
Public Sector Labor and Employment Law 321 (2nd ed. 1998). 
3See Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Town 
ofRiverhead Unit of Local 852, 25 PERB P057 (1992). 
ASupra, note 1, at 4525. 
5ld. at 3122. 
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mitigate the deteriorating fiscal condition of the City. Based upon this record, we find 
that the PBA has failed to translate its support for the concept into action. 
The ALJ correctly dismissed the timeliness defense. The City's charge was filed 
within four months of the City's letter of August 28, 2000, requesting negotiations. The 
RBA never responded to the City's-request. This, afterJhe PBA counsel wrote to the 
City on August 16, 2000, stating that a meeting of the parties was still necessary. We 
agree that this conduct acknowledged the PBA's continuing obligation to bargain and 
the record evidences its subsequent failure to do so. 
The PBA also alleges that the City has waived its right to negotiate the subject 
matter of the charge by virtue of the language of the arbitration award, subsequent 
agreement and its conduct. We do not agree. Section 205.5(d) of the Act reserves to 
PERB jurisdiction over an alleged violation of an agreement that would "otherwise 
constitute an improper employer or employee organization practice 
We have held that in certain matters where there is contractual 
language related to the subject-matter of the charge, if there exists 
an independent statutory right with respect to the subject-matter, 
we retain jurisdiction even if the respondent's action is also 
arguably in violation of the contract language.6 
In County of Nassau,7 we clarified the difference between jurisdiction and waiver, 
or duty satisfaction, as we defined it. 
[Ujnless the agreement is a reasonably arguable source of right to 
the charging party with respect to the same subject matter as the 
improper practice charge, no contract violation may be established, 
and our jurisdiction is clear. That an agreement may "cover" the 
issue raised in an improper practice charge is not enough to divest 
e
'Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga BOCES, 34 PERB P019, at 3044 (2001). See also 
City of Buffalo (Fire Dep't), 17 PERB 1J3090 (1984). 
723 PERB H3051, at 3108 (1990). 
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PERB of jurisdiction over that charge pursuant to §205.5(d) of the 
Act. Of course, if the agreement is a source of right to the 
employer, an issue of waiver of the right to negotiate may be 
presented. However, waiver of the right to negotiate is a matter 
which necessarily lies within PERB's jurisdiction. A determination 
whether a party has waived the right to negotiate an issue goes to 
the disposition of the charge on its merits, but not to PERB's power 
to reach those merits. 
While the language of the arbitration award, as incorporated by reference into the 
parties' 1992-1995 collective bargaining agreement, gives certain rights to the City with 
respect to the negotiation of a timetable for the implementation of the one-officer/two-
officer patrols, such language does not divest us of jurisdiction over an alleged violation 
of§209-a.2(b)oftheAct. 
The ALJ recognized that neither the City nor the PBA has fulfilled the 
commitments made in these documents. The parties' failure to approach this on-going 
issue with a serious intent to resolve the issue and implement their agreements with 
respect to one-officer/two-officer patrols is evidenced by the fact that they have had this 
issue before them for over ten years without finalizing their initial agreement to 
negotiate. We do not find, given the totality of the parties' conduct, that the City has 
waived its right to negotiate the timetable for the implementation of the patrols. The 
language of the arbitration award and the subsequent agreement, coupled with the 
parties' conduct, supports our conclusion that the City has retained its statutory right to 
negotiate the subject matter of the charge.8 
8See Village ofEndicott, 23 PERB 1J3053 (1990). See also Hunter-Tannersville 
Teachers' Ass'n, 16 PERB 1J3109 (1983); Incorporated Village of Lake Success, 
17 PERB |f3103 (1984). 
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We find, therefore, that we have jurisdiction over the City's allegation that the 
PBA has refused to negotiate in good faith. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the PBA's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
We find, accordingly, that the PBA violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by failing and 
refusing to negotiate in good faith with the City regarding proposals and a draft 
agreement for the implementation of a timetable to commence the utilization of one-
officer/two-officer patrols. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the PBA: 
1. Cease and desist from refusing to negotiate in good faith with the City for a 
timeline for the implementation of one-officer/two-officer patrols. 
2. Post a notice in the form attached at all locations ordinarily used to post 
written communications to unit employees. 
DATED: March 26, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
^ PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES^EAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Buffalo in the unit represented by Buffalo Police Benevolent 
Association (PBA) that the PBA will forthwith: 
1. Negotiate for a timeline to implement one-officer/two-officer patrols and immediately bargain in good 
faith regarding such implementation. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Buffalo Police Benevolent Association 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other 
material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 317, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22263 
TOWN OF SCRIBA, 
Respondent. 
CHAMBERLAIN, D'AMANDA, OPPENHEIMER & GREENFIELD (MAIREAD E. 
CONNOR of counsel), for Charging Party 
FERRARA, FIORENZA, LARRISON, BARTLETT & REITZ, P.C. (CRAIG M. 
ATLAS of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Scriba (Town) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Town violated 
§§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, as 
alleged by Teamsters Local 317, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO 
(Teamsters) in its improper practice charge, the Town engaged in bad faith bargaining 
regarding wages during negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement. 
The ALJ found that the Town refused to negotiate wages with the Teamsters 
during negotiations for the first collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters after 
the Town recognized the Teamsters as the exclusive bargaining agent for a unit of 
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certain employees of the Town's Highway Department. Finding that the Town relied 
upon a five-year salary plan with the Highway Department employees, entered into prior 
to the Teamsters' recognition, an action found by the ALJ to have been "taken arguably 
for the purpose of preventing the organization of public employees in derogation of the 
_purposes-ofJhe-Act^Lthe-ALJ-determined-thaUhe.Zown-hadJ/iolated_§-§.20-9^a,-1-(-a-)-and_-
(d) of the Act by continuing to insist that the salary plan precluded further negotiations 
on wages. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Town argues that the ALJ erred by taking evidence about the five-year 
salary plan, which it asserts is outside the scope of the instant improper practice 
charge; by finding that it refused to negotiate in good faith; and by failing to consider the 
totality of the Town's conduct in negotiations. The Teamsters supports the ALJ's 
decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ. 
FACTS 
In August 1999, the Town met with a group of then unrepresented Highway 
Department employees to discuss a salary increase for the coming year. Historically, 
the Town and the Highway employees met in August of each year to discuss the terms 
and conditions of employment for the next year. The employees proposed a salary 
increase of $.40 per hour for 2000 and the Town responded with an offer for a salary 
135 PERB 1J4501, at 4504 (2002). 
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increase for each of five years but paid up front in the first year, to equal an increase of 
$2.00 per hour in the first year. The Town's stated rationale was that it had determined 
that overtime had to be reduced or possibly eliminated and the up-front salary increase 
would make up for the average loss of overtime pay. The Town agreed to reopen salary 
-negotiations in three years-if any othertwo towns in the county paidsimilar employees 
at a higher rate.2 The Town and the employees agreed to the Town's proposal in 
September 1999. 
The Teamsters' representative, Mark May, began meeting with the Highway 
Department employees in early September 1999, discussing representation with them 
and obtaining signed membership cards. The Teamsters thereafter made a request for 
recognition to the Town Supervisor, Steve Baxter, on October 1, 1999. The Town did 
not respond. The Town Board adopted a resolution approving the wage increase on 
October 20, 1999. The Town then mailed a notice to the Highway Department 
employees informing them of the terms of the Board resolution.3 The Teamsters filed a 
petition for certification with PERB on October 31, 1999. 
On December 2, 1999, the Teamsters filed an improper practice charge 
(Case No. U-21314) with PERB, alleging that the Town had improperly entered into a 
wage agreement with the Highway Department employees during the pendency of a 
representation proceeding. Both the representation petition and the improper practice 
2The $2.00 per hour pay increase made the Town Highway Department 
employees the highest paid employees in the county in those job titles. 
) Apparently, in prior years, the notice of the wage increase was mailed to the 
Highway Supervisor and he distributed the notice to the employees. 
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charge were subsequently withdrawn, with prejudice, by the Teamsters, in January 
2000, pursuant to a settlement agreement with the Town that provided, inter alia, that 
the Town would recognize the Teamsters as the exclusive bargaining agent for the 
Highway Department employees. 
-The-parties commenced negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement in ' 
May 2000. They met eight times, then the Teamsters declared impasse on 
November 16, 2000. Thereafter, the parties met four times with a mediator assigned by 
PERB prior to the hearing on the instant charge. The Town arranged for a court 
reporter to make transcripts of the last three bargaining sessions before impasse was 
declared and of all four mediation sessions. 
At the hearing in this case, the parties entered into a stipulation on some of the 
facts and admitted into evidence portions of the negotiation and mediation transcripts. 
The Teamsters called two witnesses, May, and Tom MacDougall, who is an MEO, the 
Deputy Highway Superintendent and the Teamsters' steward. At the close of the 
Teamsters' direct case, the Town made a motion to dismiss. The ALJ reserved decision 
on the motion and the Town rested without calling any witnesses. 
During the negotiations for the collective bargaining agreement, the parties 
reached agreement on some issues but were unable to reach agreement on others. 
The issue upon which there has been no agreement, and which is the subject of the 
instant charge, is wages. The Teamsters proposed a salary increase of 7% for each 
year of the contract, for a term of three years. The Town's initial position, as articulated 
by Baxter, its chief negotiator, was for no salary increase. The rationale given by Baxter 
during the first negotiation sessions was that the Town had already given a wage 
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increase, referring to the agreement reached with the employees before the Teamsters 
was recognized as their bargaining agent. At the first mediation session held on 
December 11, 2000, Baxter altered the Town's position by stating that he needed 
justification to show the Town Board for any further action as to wages.4 
Atthe January 25, 2001 ^mediation session4he mediator asked Baxter^whatthe 
Town's financial offer was with respect to wages and Baxter responded that there was 
no offer and added: 
The answer is no. What we really need to - See, the Town 
does, and we don't want to slam the door, you know, any 
harder than we have to. We want to see inequity here, that 
we're not treating our employees properly. We want to see 
where there's wages that are outlined. We want to see 
where we, you know, haven't done, you know, our job and 
responsible job of compensating our employees properly. 
...We want to see where we're not, you know offering the 
right amount of money to the employees.5 
May then told Baxter that "[w]e understand that you front loaded the five years 
and part of it was good faith with the employees. We understand that, all right. But we 
have to get increases, okay, during the term - during the term of our contract."6 In 
response, Baxter suggested that May talk to the Town Board to explain the Teamsters' 
position with respect to salary.7 Again, at the mediation session on April 25, 2001, 
Baxter stated that the Town Board's review of the towns around the Town of Scriba and 
4Transcript of Labor Agreement Discussions, December 11, 2000, pp. 46-7. 
5Transcript of Labor Agreement Discussions, January 25, 2001, pp. 80-1. 
6/d. at p. 91. 
7May never attended a Town Board meeting for that purpose. 
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several adjoining counties showed that the Highway Department employees were "on 
the top of the heap right now in regard to wages, hours, benefits, working conditions, 
equipment."8 He then asked May for some justification for the Teamsters' proposed 
wage increase to take back to the Town Board so they would review their position with 
respect tojwages. May's response was ^Well, somebody_hasJo be number one.'!9 Later, >. 
May indicated that the Town's ability to pay was also justification for a wage increase. 
Baxter responded that the Town was facing a diminished ability to pay in the coming 
years, referring to a tax settlement agreement with a nuclear plant located within the 
Town. Baxter then expressed a willingness to make a recommendation to the Town 
Board to accept a counter-proposal on wages from the Teamsters if May provided 
proper justification for the increase. 
On June 11, 2001, at the last mediation session, May proposed a salary increase 
of $750 as a signing bonus and $.50 per hour for each year of the contract for the 
remainder of the term of the collective bargaining agreement. May testified that his 
proposal that the Town switch to the Teamsters' health insurance plan would save the 
Town enough money to fund the proposed wage increase. The Town expressed a 
willingness to utilize the Teamsters' health insurance plan but the parties reached no 
agreement in mediation on the amount of the Town's contribution. The parties 
thereafter proceeded to fact-finding.10 
8Transcript of Labor Agreement Discussions, April 25, 2001, p. 4. 
9/d 
) 10At the time of the hearing, the parties had met with the fact finder on August 29, 
2001. There is no evidence in the record about the current status of negotiations. 
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DISCUSSION 
Both parties urged the ALJ to look at the totality of the conduct of the Town in 
deciding the improper practice charge.11 Unfortunately, the ALJ focused on the subject 
matter of the prior improper practice charge, and the initial negotiations sessions 
between the parties,Jn reaching his conclusion^^^ 
year wage agreement with the then unrepresented Highway Department employees for 
the purpose of influencing them to reject representation by the Teamsters, and then 
improperly insisted that the agreement precluded the Town from negotiating any 
subsequent wage increases with the Teamsters. 
The Teamsters' prior improper practice charge alleged that the Town had 
violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act by threatening not to sign a contract with the 
Teamsters if they became certified as the bargaining agent and by telling employees 
that they would not change the terms of the five-year wage agreement with the 
employees if they became represented by the Teamsters. The Teamsters withdrew the 
improper practice charge "with prejudice" in settlement of the charge and based upon 
the Town's agreement to recognize the Teamsters as the bargaining agent for the 
Highway Department employees. 
We find that the withdrawal "with prejudice" of an improper practice charge 
precludes the introduction of the allegations which were the subject of the prior charge 
in any proceeding on a subsequent improper practice charge which alleges the same 
facts as set forth in the settled charge, even if the subsequent charge sets forth a 
11See Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 32 PERB 
1J3051 (1999). See also Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc., 14 PERB 1J3092 (1981). 
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separate, different claim. The withdrawal of a claim "with prejudice" is res judicata so as 
to bar a new claim.12 Therefore, the ALJ was precluded from determining that the 
actions of the Town which were the subject of the prior improper practice charge were 
improperly motivated because of the terms of the parties' settlement agreement and he 
was further precluded from using that finding as the-basis for-his finding of-improper .-,•:_- -^ -
motivation in the instant charge. 
Because the ALJ could not properly rely upon the Town's actions as alleged in 
the prior improper practice charge to establish a "course of conduct" by the Town, which 
would support his finding that the Town was improperly motivated when it, as alleged 
herein, failed to negotiate an agreement as to wages, he could not, based on the lack of 
evidence of animus introduced in support of the instant charge, conclude that the Town 
violated §209-a.1(a) of the Act.13 
Were it not for the withdrawal with prejudice of the prior improper practice 
charge, the ALJ could have considered the prior actions of the Town with respect to the 
unit employees, especially since the activities occurred at a time proximate to the 
Teamsters' organizing campaign. "Actions which are taken more than four months prior 
12David D. Siegel, New York Practice §298 (3d edition 1999). See also Sheriff 
and County of Oneida, 23 PERB fi4527 (1990). 
13To establish the improper motivation necessary for a finding that §209-a. 1 (a) of 
ii it; MOL nave ueti i i viuicueu, me Ci iaiymy (jcuiy IICJS me uuiuen ui ( j iuvniy c n y o y c m c i u in 
protected activities, that the employer had knowledge of the activities and that it acted 
because of those activities. If a prima facie violation has been established by direct 
evidence or by circumstantial evidence, the burden shifts to the respondent to rebut that 
violation by proof that legitimate business reasons prompted the action. Convention 
Center Operating Corp., 29 PERB 1J3022 (1996). 
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to the filing of an improper practice charge can be relevant in establishing the elements 
of a timely improper practice charge even though those acts might be barred, as 
untimely, from consideration as independent violations of the Act."14 He could have 
properly considered the Town's earlier action to determine if there were a "course of 
- c o n d u c t " - b y the Town that would have evidencedJts improper motivation inihe action ._J 
which is the subject of the instant charge.15 Because the allegations which were the 
subject of the prior charge were not properly before him, and there is no record 
evidence that the Town's negotiation posture was improperly motivated, the ALJ erred 
in determining that the Town was engaged in a course of conduct designed to thwart 
the organizing efforts of the Teamsters. 
We now turn to the alleged §209-a.1 (d) violation. An employer's obligation to 
maintain the status quo starts on the date it is presented with a bona fide representation 
question and continues to the date a wage and benefit package is fixed by collective 
negotiations with the recognized or certified bargaining agent.16 The Town 
acknowledged this obligation in negotiations. The Town's negotiator, Baxter, at the 
initial negotiations sessions, did indicate, however, that the Town believed that it had a 
wage agreement which covered the unit employees for five years and that it would not 
pay any wage increases because it had already paid the unit employees all the wage 
uGreenburgh No.11 Union Free Sch. Dist, 32 PERB1J3035, at 3080 (1999). 
15See Greenburgh No.11 Union Free Sch. Dist, 30 PERB p 0 5 2 (1997). 
wOnondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES, 25 PERB 1T3044, at 3092 (1992). 
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increases it was prepared to pay, for at least three years.17 Given our decision, infra, we 
do not need to decide whether, if the Town had continued to maintain that position 
throughout negotiations, such an insistence would be violative of §209-a.1(d) of the 
Act.18 
At least by the time the parties had reached mediation, the Town had moved — -
from that position and was indicating a willingness to negotiate some adjustment to 
wages. Baxter requested that the Teamsters provide him with some justification for, 
what was at that time, a 7% salary increase for each of at least three years. Baxter 
explained that it was the Town Board's position that the unit employees were the 
highest paid employees, with the best benefits, of employees in similar positions in all 
the towns located within Oswego County and adjacent counties and that he needed 
some justification to go to the Town Board and recommend a salary increase. May later 
modified the Teamsters' wage proposal but offered no explanation except for a glib 
"Well, somebody has to be number one" and, later, a reference to the Town's ability to 
pay. A party to collective negotiations has a right to seek an explanation of the 
proposals of the other party to the negotiations and that party has an obligation to 
explain the rationale of its negotiating position upon request.19 The Town's requests for 
171 he I own was referring to the "reopener" portion of the five-year wage pian. 
18See J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 US 332 (1944). 
j 19See Deposit Cent. Sch. Dist, 26 PERB 1J4659 (1993), aff'd, 27 PERB 1J3020 
(1994). (subsequent history omitted) 
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a rationale were met with no real explanation, although at the final mediation session 
between the parties, the Teamsters further modified its salary proposal and offered the 
Town a plan for possibly funding a wage increase. 
This record certainly evidences that the Town and the Teamsters were far apart 
on the subject of'wages.The Town maintained its position thatit would not agree to a 
salary increase, but moved from its stated rationale to a request for more information 
and a justification from the Teamsters, and eventually indicated a willingness to 
consider the Teamsters' arguments in favor of a wage increase. The Town's initial 
position that it would not offer nor agree to a salary increase does not automatically 
equate to bad faith bargaining.20 Adamancy or hard bargaining is not, by itself, evidence 
of a failure to negotiate in good faith.21 
By the totality of its conduct, we find that the Town evidenced its intention to 
negotiate in good faith. The Town maintained the status quo during negotiations, it 
reached agreement on some proposals, indicated a willingness to agree to the 
Teamsters' proposal regarding health insurance if the rate of contribution could be 
agreed upon by the parties and, finally, moved from its position of no wage increase to 
a position where it would entertain the Teamsters' wage proposal if it was satisfied with 
the rationale offered by the Teamsters. The Town also agreed to a salary reopener if 
20See Columbia County Chapter of the Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc. and 
the Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc., 10 PERB 1J3047 (1977). 
21
 Id. See also Deposit Cent. Sch. Dist., supra note 19. 
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the conditions it requested could be met.22 We find, therefore, that the ALJ also erred 
when he found that the Town had violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. 
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Town was not engaged in bad faith 
negotiations when it failed to agree to a wage increase for unit employees during 
collective negotiations with the Teamsters. We find that there is insufficient evidence 
the record to support a finding that the Town violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act. 
Therefore, the Town's exceptions are granted and the decision of the ALJ is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety.23 
DATED: March 26, 2002 
Albany, New York 
-^t^^UU^^^i 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
22We do not find, as did the ALJ, that the agreement to a wage reopener was 
pretextual because the unit employees were already the highest paid employees in the 
county in the same or similar titles. Should circumstances in other towns change the 
agreed upon condition for the reopener, the Town would be obligated to negotiate a 
wage increase. Just because the condition for the reopener is unlikely to occur does not 
render the Town's agreement to it pretextual or evidence of bad faith negotiations. 
23Member Abbott recused himself from consideration of this case. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Audrey Gore to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing Gore's improper practice charge alleging 
that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
CASE NO. U-22678 
Board - U-22678 -2 
(CSEA) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
failing to respond to inquiries she made to CSEA staff. CSEA raised a jurisdictional 
defense that, in addition to PERB lacking jurisdiction over the charge, Health Research, 
Inc. (HRI) is a private sector employer and Gore was not, therefore, a public employee 
while in the^mployof "HRT.T Th^7\TJ]p-aTrted HRr 
litigate the jurisdiction defense. 
The ALJ determined that Gore had not set forth sufficient facts to prove that HRI 
is a public employer within the meaning of the Act. Gore contends in her exceptions 
that the ALJ was incorrect. In support of her exceptions, she annexed a copy of the 
Certificate of Incorporation of HRI, a membership corporation. 
In opposition to Gore's exceptions, HRI has raised an objection that it was not 
served as required by §213.2(a) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). Having reviewed 
the record and considered the parties' arguments, we dismiss and deny the exceptions 
on procedural grounds. 
Section 213.2(a) of our Rules requires a party filing exceptions to serve those 
exceptions on all other parties and to file proof of such service with us. Gore has not 
done either. As service is a component of timely filing, we will dismiss exceptions upon 
objection by a party who has not been served.1 Gore's exceptions, not having been 
served on CSEA and HRI, must be dismissed. 
1
 County of Washington, 32 PERB fl3033 (1999); see also Yonkers City School 
District, 30 PERB ^[3026 (1997). 
Board - U-22678 -3 
Based upon the foregoing, we need not reach the merits of Gore's exceptions. 
Therefore, the exceptions are dismissed and denied and the ALJ's decision dismissing 
the improper practice charge is affirmed.' SO ORDERED. 
DATED: March 26, 2002 
Albany, New York 
feiel R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ JJohn T. Mitchell, Member 
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NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
Local 264 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
CASE NO. C-5155 
^ 
Certification - C-5155 page 2 
Included: All full-time and regular part-time transportation supervisors 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
-•negotiate-Golleetively-wJth4he4Rtemational-Bfotherhood-of-Team-ster-s-LoGal--264.-^r-he-
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 26, 2002 
Albany, New York 
